We examine the evidence on excess stock return predictability in a Bayesian setting in which the investor faces uncertainty about both the existence and strength of predictability.
Introduction
This paper investigates the evidence in favor of stock return predictability from a modelselection perspective. Much recent empirical work has focused on the predictive regression r t+1 = α + βx t + u t+1 ,
where r t+1 denotes the return on a broad stock index in excess of the riskfree rate, x t denotes a predictor variable, and u t+1 is a noise term. Taking expectations implies that α + βx t is the conditional equity premium. If β is not equal to zero, then the equity premium varies over time.
One approach to investigating whether stock returns are predictable involves running an ordinary least squares regression (OLS) on (1) and asking whether the predictive coefficient β is significantly different from zero. As emphasized in a simulation study by Kandel and Stambaugh (1996) , however, this approach has the disadvantage that classical significance may not be indicative of whether the level of predictability is of economic significance.
If β is found to be insignificant, or only marginally significant, one cannot conclude that predictability "does not exist" as far as economic agents are concerned.
In this study we adopt a Bayesian approach to inference on (1) that takes model uncertainty as well as parameter uncertainty into account. An investor evaluates the evidence in favor of equation (1) as opposed to a null hypothesis
The investor assigns a prior probability q to a state of the world where (1) describes returns (i.e. the equity premium is time-varying) and thus a prior probability 1 − q to the state of the world where (2) describes returns (i.e. the equity premium is constant). The investor's beliefs about returns after viewing the data involves assigning a posterior probability to (1), as well as a posterior distribution to the parameters of interest conditional on (1) and (2).
Our paper builds on several active strands of research in portfolio choice. One such strand analyzes predictive regressions assuming parameter, but not model uncertainty (e.g. Bar-beris (2000) , Johannes, Polson, and Stroud (2002) , Brandt, Goyal, Santa-Clara, and Stroud (2005) , Pastor and Stambaugh (2009) , Skoulakis (2007) , Stambaugh (1999) , Wachter and Warusawitharana (2009)) . A second strand focuses on model uncertainty, but assumes that the parameters within the model are known (e.g. Chen, Ju, and Miao (2009) , Hansen (2007) , Maenhout (2006) ). A third strand allows for both model and parameter uncertainty, but assumes returns are independent and identically distributed (e.g. Chen and Epstein (2002) , Garlappi, Uppal, and Wang (2007) , Uppal and Wang (2003) ). 1 Our paper builds on this work by assuming that the investor faces both parameter and model uncertainty, and considers the possibility that returns are predictable.
Our paper also builds on recent research on return predictability and Bayesian model selection (Avramov (2002) , Cremers (2002) ). These papers make the assumption of strict exogeneity, an assumption that is frequently satisfied in a standard ordinary least squares regression, but rarely satisfied in a predictive regression (in a related contribution, Pesaran and Timmermann (1995) study model selection but allow investors to be non-Bayesian).
By making use of methods developed in Wachter and Warusawitharana (2009) , we are able to formulate and solve the Bayesian investor's problem when the regressor is stochastic and correlated with returns. Our paper therefore incorporates the insights of the frequentist literature on predictive return regressions (Cavanagh, Elliott, and Stock (1995) , Nelson and Kim (1993) , Stambaugh (1999) , Lewellen (2004) , Torous, Valkanov, and Yan (2004), Campbell and Yogo (2006) ) into a Bayesian portfolio selection setting.
When we apply our methods to predicting returns by the dividend-price ratio, we find that an investor who believes that there is a 50% probability of predictability prior to seeing the data updates to a 86% posterior probability after viewing quarterly postwar data. We find average certainty equivalent returns of 1% per year when the dividend-price ratio is used 1 Some of this work considers model uncertainty together with ambiguity aversion. In order to better focus on the affect of parameter and model uncertainty on the investor's decision-making, we do not consider ambiguity aversion here. Our findings are nonetheless relevant to this literature because, when learning is allowed, Bayesian updating plays an important role in the decision process of the ambiguity-averse investor.
as a predictor variable for an investor whose prior probability in favor of predictability is just 20%. For an investor who believes that there is a 50/50 chance of return predictability, certainty equivalent returns are 1.72%.
We also empirically evaluate the effect of correctly incorporating the initial observation of the dividend-price ratio into the likelihood (the exact likelihood approach) versus the more common conditional likelihood approach. In the conditional likelihood approach, the initial observation of the predictor variable is treated as a known parameter rather than as a draw from the data generating process. We find that the use of the conditional likelihood implies Bayes factors (the ratio of the likelihood of model (1) to (2)) that are substantially smaller as compared to when the initial observation is treated as a draw from the data generating process. The posterior for the unconditional risk premium is highly unstable when we condition on the first observation. However, when this is treated as a draw from the data generating process, the expected return is estimated reliably. Surprisingly, the posterior mean of the unconditional risk premium differs from the sample average.
Finally, when we examine the evolution of posterior beliefs over the postwar period, we find substantial differences between the beliefs implied by our approach, which treats the regressor as stochastic and realistically captures the relation between the regressor and returns, and beliefs implied by assuming strictly exogenous regressors. In particular, our approach implies that the belief in the predictability of returns rises substantially over the 2000-2005 period while approaches assuming strict exogeneity imply a decline.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our statistical method and contrasts it with alternative approaches. Section 3 describes our empirical results. Section 4 concludes.
Statistical Method

Data generating processes
Let r t+1 denote continuously compounded excess returns on a stock index from time t to t + 1 and x t the value of a (scalar) predictor variable. We assume that this predictor variable follows the process
Stock returns can be predictable, in which case they follow the process (1) or unpredictable, in which case they follow the process (2). In either case, errors are serially uncorrelated, homoskedastic, and jointly normal:
and
As we show below, the correlation between innovations to returns and innovations to the state variable implies that (3) affects inference about returns, even when there is no predictability.
When the process (3) is stationary, i.e. ρ is between -1 and 1, the state variable has an unconditional mean of
and a variance of
These follow from taking unconditional means and variances on either side of (3). Note that these are population values conditional on knowing the parameters. Given these, the population R 2 is defined as
Prior Beliefs
The investor faces uncertainty both about the model (i.e. whether returns are predictable or not), and about the parameters of the model. We represent this uncertainty through a hierarchical prior. There is a probability q, that investors face the distribution given by (1),
and (4). We denote this state of the world H 1 . There is a probability 1 − q that investors face the distribution given by (2), (3) and (4). We denote this state of the world H 0 . As we will show, the stochastic properties of x have relevance in both cases.
The prior information on the parameters is conditional on H i . Let
Note that p(b 1 , Σ|H 1 ) can also be written as p(β, b 0 , Σ|H 1 ).
2 We set the prior on b 0 and Σ so that
We assume the investor has uninformative beliefs on these parameters. We follow the approach of Stambaugh (1999) and Zellner (1996) , and derive a limiting Jeffreys prior as explained in Appendix A. As Appendix A shows, this limiting prior takes the form
for ρ ∈ (−1, 1), and zero otherwise.
The parameter that distinguishes H 0 from H 1 is β. One approach would be to write down a prior distribution for β unconditional on the remaining parameters. However, it is difficult to think about priors on β in isolation from beliefs about other parameters. For example, a high variance of x t might lower one's prior on β, while a large residual variance of r t might raise it. Rather than placing a prior on β directly, we follow Wachter and Warusawitharana (2009) and place a prior on the population R 2 . To implement this prior on the R 2 , we place a prior on "normalized" β, that is β adjusted for the variance of x and the variance of u.
denote normalized β. We assume that prior beliefs on η are given by
The population R 2 is closely related to η:
Equation (10) provides a mapping between a prior distribution on η and a prior distribution on the population R 2 . Given an η draw, an R 2 draw can be computed using (10).
A prior on η implies a hierarchical prior on β. The prior for η, (9), implies
where
Because σ x is a function of ρ and σ v , the prior on β is also implicitly a function of these parameters. The parameter σ η indexes the degree to which the prior is informative. As σ η → ∞, the prior over β becomes uninformative; all values of β are viewed as equally likely. As σ η → 0, the prior converges to p(b 0 , Σ) multiplied by a point mass at 0, implying a dogmatic view in no predictability. Combining (11) with (8) implies the joint prior under
Jeffreys invariance theory provides an independent justification for modeling priors on β as (11). Stambaugh (1999) shows that the limiting Jeffreys prior for b 1 and Σ equals
This prior corresponds to the limit of (12) as σ η approaches infinity. Modeling the prior for β as depending on σ x not only has a convenient interpretation in terms of the distribution of the R 2 , but also implies that an infinite prior variance represents ignorance as defined by Jeffreys (1961) . Note that a prior on β that is independent of σ x would not have this property. Figure 1 shows the resulting distribution for the population R 2 for various values of σ η .
Panel A shows the distribution conditional on H 1 while Panel B shows the unconditional distribution. More precisely, for any value k, Panel A shows the prior probability that the R 2 exceeds k, conditional on the existence of predictability. For large values of σ η , e.g. 100, the prior probability that the R 2 exceeds k across the relevant range of values for the R 2 is close to one. The lower the value of σ η , the less variability in β around its mean of zero, and the lower the probability that the R 2 exceeds k for any value of k. Panel B shows the unconditional probability that the R 2 exceeds k for any value of k, assuming that the prior probability of predictability, q, is equal to 0.5. By the definition of conditional probability: 
, and let
In the above, the vec operator stacks the elements of the matrix columnwise. It follows that the likelihood conditional on H 1 and on the first observation x 0 takes the form of
(see Zellner (1996) ).
The likelihood function (14) conditions on the first observation of the predictor variable, Stambaugh (1999) argues for treating x 0 and x 1 , . . . , x T symmetrically: as random draws from the data generating process. If the process for x t is stationary and has run for a substantial period of time, then results in Hamilton (1994, p. 265) imply that x 0 is a draw from a multivariate normal distribution with mean µ x and standard deviation σ x . Combining the likelihood of the first observation with the likelihood of the remaining T observations produces
Following Box and Tiao (1973) , we refer to (14) as the conditional likelihood and (15) as the exact likelihood.
Likelihood under H 0
Under H 0 , returns and the state variable follow the processes given in (2) and (3). Let
where ι T is the T × 1 vector of ones. Then the conditional likelihood can be written as
Using similar reasoning as in the H 1 case, the exact likelihood is given by
As above, we refer to (16) as the conditional likelihood and (17) as the exact likelihood.
Posterior distribution
The investor updates his prior beliefs to form the posterior distribution upon seeing the data. As we discuss below, this posterior requires the computation of two quantities: the posterior of the parameters conditional on the absence or presence of return predictability, and the posterior probability that returns are predictable. Given these two quantities, we can simulate from the posterior distribution.
To compute the posteriors, we apply Bayes' rule conditional on the model:
Because σ x is a nonlinear function of the underlying parameters, the posterior distributions conditional on H 0 and H 1 are nonstandard and must by computed numerically. We can sample from these distributions quickly and accurately using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm (see Chib and Greenberg (1995) , Johannes and Polson (2006) ). See Appendix B for details.
Letq denote the posterior probability that excess returns are predictable. By definition,
It follows from Bayes' rule, thatq
is the Bayes factor for the alternative hypothesis of predictability against the null of no predictability. The Bayes factor is a likelihood ratio in that it is the likelihood of return predictability divided by the likelihood of no predictability. However, it differs from the standard likelihood ratio in that the likelihoods p(D|H i ) are not conditional on the values of the parameters. These likelihoods are given by
To form these likelihoods, the likelihoods conditional on parameters (the likelihood functions generally used in classical statistics) are integrated over the prior distribution of the parameters. Under our distributions, these integrals cannot be computed analytically. However, the Bayes factor (20) can be computed directly using the generalized Savage-Dickey ratio (Dickey (1971) , Verdinelli and Wasserman (1995) ). Details can be found in Appendix C.
Putting these two pieces together, we draw from the posterior parameter distribution by drawing from p(b 1 , Σ|D, H 1 ) with probabilityq and from p(b 0 , Σ|D, H 0 ) with probability 1 −q.
An alternative: Strictly exogenous regressors
An alternative approach to inference is to adopt the standard assumptions of ordinary least squares regression, namely that the regressors x t are known, or are strictly exogenous in the sense that u s and v t are uncorrelated for all s and t. For example, consider the priors and likelihood proposed by Fernandez, Ley, and Steel (2001) . Letσ x denote the sample variance of x:σ
Fernandez et al. propose the following priors on α, β and σ u :
where κ is a constant that determines the informativeness of the prior, and
The specification is completed by setting p(α) ∝ 1. These assumptions on the prior are combined with the likelihood
The expressions for the prior and likelihood under H 0 are analogous. Similar specifications are employed by Chipman, George, and McCulloch (2001) , Cremers (2002) , Watson (2011) and Wright (2008) . This formulation is closely related to the conjugate prior described in Zellner (1996) . Like Zellner's prior, it leads to analytical expressions for the posterior distribution and Bayes factor.
The above specification differs from ours in two ways. First, the prior beliefs condition on observations on x t . Second, and more fundamentally, the likelihood function conditions on x t , namely, it treats it as known. The two are related, in that both assumptions are most reasonable in cases where x t is known at time t, or is strictly exogenous in that all correlations between u t and v t are zero. To see this, note that (24) takes the form
where the terms in the product are given by the normal density. However, the true conditional likelihood is the product of multivariate normal terms:
One could separate out the terms in the product as follows
Under the assumption that u t+1 and v t+1 are uncorrelated in the prior (strict exogeneity), the second term will not depend on α, β and σ u , and it is valid to drop it.
3 Note that this expression still omits the likelihood for the initial observation x 0 .
In a time series setting, the assumption of strict exogeneity or fixed regressors is not realistic. Information may be lost by failing to consider the additional terms in (26). This is widely known, and computational feasibility is given as a reason for the assumption. This study evaluates the impact of eliminating this assumption in the (admittedly simple) setting of a single regressor. We expect that our conclusions would extent to settings of multiple regressors.
3 Results
Data
We use data from the Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP). We compute excess stock returns by subtracting the continuously compounded 3-month Treasury bill return from the return on the value-weighted CRSP index at a quarterly frequency. Following a large empirical literature on return predictability, we focus on the dividend-price ratio as the regressor because the present-value relation between prices and returns suggests that it should capture variables that predict stock returns. The dividend-price ratio is computed by dividing the dividend payout over the previous 12 months with the current price of the stock index. The use of 12 months of data accounts for seasonalities in dividend payments. We use the logarithm of the dividend-price ratio as the predictor variable. Data are quarterly from 1952 to 2009. (21) that the likelihoods of the data under these two scenarios are nearly the same and that the Bayes factor is nearly one. This is intuitive: when two hypotheses are close, a great deal of data are required to distinguish one from the other.
Bayes factors and posterior means
The fact that the Bayes factor approaches zero as P (R 2 >, 01|H 1 ) increases is less intuitive. The reduction in Bayes factors implies that, as the investor allows a greater range of values for the R 2 , the posterior probability that returns are predictable approaches zero.
This effect is known as Bartlett's paradox, and was first noted by Bartlett (1957) ing from the exact versus the conditional likelihood. The Bayes factors resulting from the exact likelihood are larger than those resulting from the conditional likelihood, thus implying a greater posterior probability of return predictability. This difference reflects the fact that the posterior mean of β, conditional on H 1 , is higher for the exact likelihood than for the conditional likelihood, and the posterior mean is ρ is lower.
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We can use the connection between the posterior means and the Bayes factor to understand why the Bayes factor changes with the specification. Using the exact likelihood leads to lower posterior values of ρ. This is because the exact likelihood leads to more precise estimates of µ x , and therefore lower estimates of σ x . Because the posterior mean of ρ is lower, the posterior mean of β is higher, and the Bayes factor is higher.
The long-run equity premium
For the predictability model, the expected excess return on stocks (the equity premium)
varies over time. In the long run, however, the current value of x t becomes irrelevant. Under our assumptions x t is stationary with mean µ x , and therefore r t is also stationary with mean
As is the case with µ x , this is a population value that conditions on the value of the parameters. For the no-predictability model, µ r is simply equal to α. We can think of µ r as the average equity premium; the fact that it is "too high" constitutes the equity premium puzzle (Mehra and Prescott (1985) ), and it is often computed by simply taking the sample average of excess returns.
The posterior expectation of µ r under various specifications is shown in the fifth column of Table 1 . Because differences in the expected return arise from differences in the posterior 4 The source of this negative relation is the negative correlation between shocks to returns and shocks to the predictor variable. Suppose that a draw of β is below its value predicted by ordinary least squares (OLS).
This implies that the OLS value for β is "too high", i.e. in the sample shocks to the predictor variable are followed by shocks to returns of the same sign. Therefore shocks to the predictor variable tend to be followed by shocks to the predictor variable that are of different signs. Thus the OLS value for ρ is "too low". This explains why values of the posterior mean of ρ are higher for low values of P (R 2 > 0.01|H 1 ) (and hence low values of the posterior mean of β) than for high values, and higher than the ordinary least squares estimate.
mean of the predictor variable x, the table also reports the posterior mean of µ x . The differences in the long-run equity premium are striking. The sample average of the (continuously compounded) excess return on stocks over this period is 4.49%. However, assuming the exact likelihood implies produces a range for this excess return between 3.45% and 3.90%
depending on the strength of the prior. Why is the equity premium in these cases as much as a full percentage point lower?
To answer this question, it is helpful to look at the posterior means of the predictor variable, reported in the next column of Table 1 . For the exact likelihood specification, the posterior mean of the log dividend yield ranges from -3.25 to -3.40. The sample mean is -3.54.
It follows that the shocks v t over the sample period must be negative on average. Because of the negative correlation between shocks to the dividend price ratio and to expected returns, the shocks u t must be positive on average. Therefore the posterior mean lies below the sample mean.
Continuing with the exact likelihood case, the posterior mean of µ x is highest (and hence furthest from the sample mean) in the no-predictability model, and becomes lower as the prior becomes less dogmatic. Excess returns follow this pattern in reverse, namely they are lowest (and furthest from the sample mean) for the no-predictability model and highest for the predictability model with the least dogmatic prior. This effect may arise from the persistence ρ. The more dogmatic the prior, the closer the posterior mean of the persistence is to one. The more persistent the process, the more likely the positive shocks are to accumulate, and the more the sample mean is likely to deviate from the true posterior mean.
The results are very different when the conditional likelihood is used, as shown in Panel B.
For the no-predictability model, µ r = α is equal to the sample mean. However, as long as there is some predictability, estimation of µ r depends on µ x , which is unstable due to the presence of 1−ρ in the denominator. It is striking that, in contrast to our main specification, the conditional likelihood specification has great difficultly in pinning down the mean of expected excess stock returns.
The posterior distribution
We now examine the posterior probability that excess returns are predictable. For convenience, we present results for our main specification that uses the exact likelihood. As a first step, we examine the posterior distribution for the R
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The posterior distribution of the R 2 Figure 2 shows two plots on the prior and posterior distribution of the R 2 with priors P (R 2 > 1% | H 1 ) = 0.50 and q = 0.5. Panel A plots P (R 2 > k) as a function of k for both the prior and the posterior; this corresponds to 1 minus the cumulative density function of the R 2 .
5 The plot for the P (R 2 > k) demonstrates a rightward shift for the posterior for values of k below (roughly) 2%.
The strength of the predictability can be seen in that while the prior implies P (R 2 > 1%) = 0.25, the posterior implies P (R 2 > 1%) close to 0.50. Thus, after observing the data, an investor revises his beliefs on the strength of predictability substantially upward. Panel B plots the probability density function of the R 2 . The prior places the highest density on low values of the R 2 . The posterior however places high density in the region around 2%
and has lower density than the prior for R 2 values close to zero. The evidence in favor of predictability, with a moderate R 2 , is sufficient to overcome the investor's initial skepticism.
The posterior probability of return predictability Figure 2 shows the posterior R 2 for a given set of prior beliefs. Table 2 shows how various statistics on the posterior distribution vary as the prior distribution changes. Table 2 presents the posterior probabilities of predictability as a function of the investor's prior about the existence of predictability, q, and the prior belief on the strength of predictability. The posterior probability is increasing in q and hump-shaped in the strength of the prior, reflecting the fact that the Bayes factors are hump-shaped in the strength of the prior. The results demonstrate that investors with moderate beliefs on both the existence and strength of predictability revise their beliefs on the existence on predictability sharply upward. For example, an investor with q = 0.5 and P (R 2 > .01|H 1 ) = 0.50 conclude that the posterior likelihood of predictability equals 0.86 This result is robust to a wide range of choices for P (R 2 > .01|H 1 ). As the table shows, P (R 2 > .01|H 1 ) = 0.25 implies a posterior probability of 0.87. The posterior probability falls off dramatically as P (R 2 > .01|H 1 ) approaches one; for these very diffuse priors (which imply what might be considered an economically unreasonable amount of predictability), the Bayes factors are close to zero. Table 2 also shows reasonably high means of the β and the R 2 , except for the diffuse prior.
The above analysis evaluates the statistical evidence on predictability. The Bayesian approach also enables us to study the economic gains from market timing. In particular,
we can evaluate the certainty equivalent loss from failing to time the market under different priors on the existence and strength of predictability.
Certainty equivalent returns
We now measure the economic significance of the predictability evidence using certainty equivalent returns. We assume an investor who maximizes
, and w is the weight on the risky asset. The expectation is taken with respect to the predictive distribution
is given by (1) with probabilityq and (2) with probability 1 −q. The posterior distribution of the parameters is described in Section 2.4.
For any portfolio weight w, we can compute the certainty equivalent return as solving
Following Kandel and Stambaugh (1996) , we measure utility loss as the difference between certainty equivalent returns from following the optimal strategy and from following a suboptimal strategy. We define the sub-optimal strategy as the strategy that the investor would follow if he believes that there is no predictability. Note, however, that the expectation in (27) is computed with respect to the same distribution for both the optimal and sub-optimal strategy.
Panel D of Table 2 shows the difference in certainty equivalent returns as described above.
These differences are averaged over the posterior distribution for x to create a difference that is not conditional on any specific value. The data indicate economically meaningful economic losses from failing to time the market. Panel D shows that, for example, an investor with a prior on β such that P (R 2 > .01|H 1 ) = 0.50 and a 50% prior belief in the existence of return predictability would suffer a certainty equivalent loss of 1.72% (in annual terms) from failing to time the market. Higher values of q imply greater certainty equivalent losses.
Evolution of the posterior distribution over time
We next describe the evolution of the posterior distribution over time. This distribution exhibits surprising behavior over the [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] period. This behavior is a direct result of the stochastic properties of the predictor variable x t .
Starting in 1972, we compute the posterior distribution conditional on having observed data up to and including that year. We start in 1972 because this allows for twenty years of data for the first observation. The posterior is computed by simulating 500,000 draws and dropping the first 100,000. To save on computation time, we update the posterior every year. For reference, Figure 3 shows the time-series of the log dividend-price ratio. As we will see, much of the behavior of the posterior distribution can be understood based on the time series of this ratio. Figure 4 shows the posterior probability of predictability (q) in Panel A (assuming a prior probability of 0.5). The solid line corresponds to our benchmark specification. This line is above 90% for most of the sample (it is actually at its lowest value at the end of the sample). In the 2000-2005 period, the probability is not distinguishable from one. This is surprising: intuition would suggest that the period in which the dividend-price ratio was rising far above its long-run mean (and during which returns kept being high despite these high levels) would correspond to an exceptionally low posterior probability of predictability, not a high one. Indeed, it is surprising that data could ever lead the investor to a nearly 100% certainty about the predictability model. The fact that the posterior ρ rises to meet the OLS ρ, and even exceeds it, indicates that the model interprets the rise of the dividend-price ratio as occurring because of an unusual sequence of positive shocks v t . Namely, positive shocks are more likely to occur after positive shocks during this period. This implies that negative shocks to u t are also more likely to follow positive shocks v t than they should, so OLS will in fact underestimate the true β (or it will overestimate the true β by less than usual).
This result is similar in spirit to that found in the frequentist analysis of Lewellen (2004) and Campbell and Yogo (2006) (see also the discussion in the survey article Campbell (2008)).
It is also an example of how information about shocks that are correlated with errors from a forecasting model can help improve forecasts, as in Faust and Wright (2011) . Figure 4 shows that the consequences of this result for model selection are quite large. This is because the no-predictability model implies, of course, that β is zero. However, given that OLS finds a positive β, the no-predictability model implies that positive shocks to the dividend-price ratio were follows by positive shocks to returns. This is extremely unlikely, given the time series. Thus the evidence comes to strongly favor the predictability model.
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Not surprisingly, this result requires knowledge of the behavior of shocks to the predictor variable. The exogenous-regressor approach described above eliminates such knowledge and leads to completely different inference over this time period. To illustrate this result, we compute the posterior probability of return predictability (by the dividend-price ratio), and the Bayes factor, using the prior-likelihood combination of Cremers (2002) . 8 Very similar results are obtained for the methods in Avramov (2002) . These models show a decline in the probability of the predictability model over the 2000-2005 period, stemming from the decline in the OLS estimate of β over this period. This result suggests that taking into account the stochastic properties of the regressor can have a substantial effect on model selection.
7 We also performed this analysis using the conditional rather than the exact likelihood. Because the results are qualitatively the same, we do not present them here. 8 We use the priors corresponding to Cremers "confident" view. Varying the choice of prior parameters does not impact the qualitative result that we present.
Conclusion
This study has taken a Bayesian model selection approach to the question of whether the equity premium varies over time. We considered investors who face uncertainty both over whether predictability exists, and over the strength of predictability if it does exist. We found substantial evidence in favor of predictability when the dividend-price ratio is used to predict returns. Moreover, we found large certainty equivalent losses from failing to time the market, even for investors who have strong prior beliefs in a constant equity premium.
Several of our results demonstrate the surprising importance of taking the stochastic nature of the dividend-price ratio into account. First, we find that using the exact likelihood rather than the more common conditional likelihood has large implications for inference. We find that using the exact likelihood implies estimates of the unconditional equity premium that differ from the sample averages. We also find that the time series of posterior probabilities look dramatically different from those computed using the more common approach of assuming that the regressor is strictly exogenous. These results suggest that the way that the regressor is modeled is very important. We hope to examine this issue further in future work.
Taking the expectation conditional on b 0 and Σ implies
Using arguments in Stambaugh (1999) , it can be shown that
(see Box and Tiao (1973, pp. 474-475) ). Therefore
This matrix Φ has the same determinant as −E ∂ 2 l 0 ∂b 0 ∂b 0 because 2 columns and 2 rows have been reversed.
From the formula for the determinant of a partitioned matrix, it follows that
it follows that
The determinant of Σ equals
Substituting into (A.7),
The Jacobian of the transformation from Σ −1 to Σ is |Σ| −3 . Therefore,
B Sampling from Posterior Distributions
This section describes how to sample from the posterior distributions. In all cases, the sampling procedure for the posteriors under H 1 and H 0 involve the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. Below we describe the case of the exact likelihood in detail. The procedure for the conditional likelihood is similar.
B.1 Posterior distribution under H 0
Substituting (8) and (17) into (18) implies that
This posterior does not take the form of a standard density function because of the term in the likelihood involving x 0 (note that σ 2 x is a nonlinear function of ρ and σ v ). However, we can sample from the posterior using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm.
The Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is implemented "block-at-a-time", by repeatedly sampling from p(Σ|b 0 , H 0 , D) and from p(b 0 |Σ, H 0 D) and repeating. To calculate a proposal density for Σ, note that
The proposal density for the conditional probability of Σ is the inverted Wishart with T + 2 degrees of freedom and scale factor of (Y − XB 0 ) (Y − XB 0 ). The target is therefore
It follows from completing the square that
The proposal density for b 0 is therefore multivariate normal with meanb 0 and variancecovariance matrix V 0 . The accept-reject algorithm of Chib and Greenberg (1995, Section 5) is used to sample from the target density, which is equal to
Note that σ u and Σ are in the constant of proportionality. Drawing successively from the conditional posteriors for Σ and b 0 produces a density that converges to the full posterior conditional on H 0 .
B.2 Posterior distribution under H 1
Substituting (12) and (15) into (18) implies that
The sampling procedure is similar to that described in Appendix B.1. Details can be found in Wachter and Warusawitharana (2009) . To summarize, we first draw from the posterior
The proposal density is an inverted Wishart with T + 2 degrees of freedom and scale factor (Y − XB 1 ) (Y − XB 1 ), where
We then draw from p(θ, ρ | α, β, Σ, H 1 , D). The proposal density is multivariate normal with mean and variance determined by the conditional normal distribution. Finally, we draw from D) . In this case, the target and the proposal are the same, and are also multivariate normal. Verdinelli and Wasserman (1995) provide an implementable formula for the inverse of the Bayes factor. In our notation, this formula can be written as
C Computing the Bayes factor
As discussed in Appendix B.2, the posterior distribution of α and β conditional on the remaining parameters is normal. We can therefore compute p(β = 0 | b 0 , Σ, H 1 , D) (including integration constants) in closed form, by using the properties of the conditional normal distribution. Consider N draws from the full posterior: ((b
we can write (b
. We use these draws to integrate out over b 0 and Σ. It follows from (C.2) that
where the approximation is accurate for large N .
To compute the second term in (C.1), we observe that
x σ u . We require the expectation taken with respect to the posterior distribution conditional on the existence of predictability and the realization β = 0. To calculate this expectation, we draw ((b Given these draws from the posterior distribution, the second term equals
where this approximation is accurate for N large. Notes: The Bayes factor equals the probability of the data D given the predictability model H 1 divided by the probability of the data given the no-predictability model H 0 :
. Bayes factors are reported for various priors of the strength of predictability under H 1 , indexed by P (R 2 > 0.01|H 1 ) (namely, the prior probability that the population R 2 exceeds 0.01, assuming H 1 ). Posterior means are conditional on H 1 and are computed for the predictability coefficient β, the persistence of the dividend-price ratio ρ, the mean of the continuously compounded excess return µ r , and the mean of the predictor variable µ x . In Panel C, µ r and µ x equal the sample means. Data are quarterly from 7/1/1952 to 3/31/2009. Notes: The figures plot the prior probability that the R 2 will be greater than some value Time Notes: Panel A shows the posterior probability of H 1 (the predictability model), assuming a prior probability of 0.5. Panel B shows the Bayes factor, equal to the probability of the data given the predictability model H 1 divided by the probability of the data given the nopredictability model H 0 . Both panels assume P (R 2 > 0.01|H 1 ) (namely, the prior probability that the population R 2 exceeds 0.01, given H 1 ) is equal to 0.5. The Bayes factor and the posterior probability are computed using quarterly data beginning in 7/1/1952 and ending at the time shown on the x-axis. The solid line shows results for the main specification; the dotted line shows results for a model assuming a non-stochastic regressor. Notes: Panels show means of posterior distributions assuming a prior probability of the predictability model and P (R 2 > 0.01|H 1 ) (the prior probability that the population R 2 exceeds 0.01, given H 1 ) equal to 0.5. The posterior distributions are computed using quarterly data beginning in 7/1/1952 and ending at the time shown on the x-axis. OLS denotes coefficients from ordinary least squares regression, computed over the same time interval
